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Abstract
According to the literature, the effect of remittances on income inequality in origin countries of
migrants is not clear, whatever empirical approach is used. Aiming at clearing up this ambiguity,
some authors took into account the historical, social or economic context of the home countries
considered. The underlying idea of most of these studies is actually that the impact of remittances
on income inequality depends on whom migrates, i.e. on the location migrants occupy in income
distribution in their home country. However, to our knowledge, no macroeconomic study exami-
ning the remittances effect on inequality, consider the composition of migratory flows. To reveal
at the macroeconomic level the position of migrants in income distribution at origin, we introduce
in our equation of inequality non-linearities in the level of development of the recipient countries,
in the costs of migration and in the level of brain drain. Using a panel sample of 80 developing
countries over the period 1970-2000, and even by factoring in the endogeneity of remittances, this
paper provides evidence of some characteristics of countries of origin in which there is an inequality-
decreasing effect of remittances on income inequality. It turns out that countries belonging to the
Mediterranean Basin have the characteristics revealed.
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1 Introduction
For many developing countries, international migrants’ remittances (financial flows ari-
sing from the cross-border movement of nationals of a country) have emerged as a significant
source of external financing over the past two decades. During the last decade the remit-
tances growth exceeded that of private capital flows and of foreign public aid. According
to the last World bank estimations, since 2002 migrants’ remittances to developing coun-
tries would have more than doubled and would reach 251 billion dollars US in 2007 (figure
that might be much higher given the unknown extent of unrecorded flows passing through
informal channels). This magnitude added to their relative stability over time and to their
potential macroeconomic effects generate a growing interest from the international com-
munity for these special capital flows. Even if research on remittances impacts in recipient
countries is expanding, only few studies consider the role played by these flows on income
distribution in the communities of origin.
Furthermore, these studies examining the potential effect of migrants’ remittances on
income distribution in recipient countries lead to conflicting findings. While some papers
indicate an inequality-inceasing effect of remittances in countries of origin, others reach
an inverse conclusion. This contradiction is due to the fact that the effect of remittances
on inequality depends on whom emigrates and so, on whom sends money back. We can
imagine that if migrants come mainly from the poorest fringes of the population in their
country of origin, remittances will benefit essentially to the poor, what will allow to reduce
income inequality in the recipient countries. On the contrary, if migration costs are such as
only the richest people can go away, it is logical to think that in this case remittances will
reach only the richest households of home countries and thus increase income inequality.
The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical evidence that the relationship between
international remittances and income inequality depends on whom migrates by introducing
non-linearities in our income inequality equations. Whereas some authors (Jones, 1998
Stark et al., 1986, Koechlin and Leon, 2006) argued that the effect of remittances on
inequality varies with the stage of migration history, we show that this effect depends
on migration costs, on the level of development and on the level of brain drain in home
countries.
By estimating successively our equations with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and with
instrumental variables, our findings suggest that :
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– the more the mean income of the recipient country is high, the more remittances
reduce income inequality,
– international remittances become more unequilizing as the costs of emigration in-
crease,
– the more the braindrain is important, the more remittances raise income inequality,
– the Mediterranean Basin is a region where remittances reduce significantly inter-
households inequality.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly summarize the literature
examining the impact of remittances on income distribution which leads to conflicting
findings. Then, we present different papers trying to explain this ambiguity, what leads
us to consider the location of migrants in the income distribution. Section 2 describes
our theoretical model based on the Gonzales-König and Wodon’s (2005) one. Section 3
consists in presenting the results of our econometrical regressions which allow us to reveal
some characteristics of recipient countries for which remittances may reduce inequality. In
section 4 we finally use our findings to examine the Mediterranean Basin case.
2 Remittances effect on income inequality : overview of the
literature
2.1 The ambiguous effect of remittances on the distribution of income
Existing findings on the impact of remittances on income inequality are conflicting,
whatever approach is used (remittances considered as exogeneous or regarded as a substi-
tute for the domestic income the household would have earned if the emigrant had stayed
home).
The simpliest way to investigate the remittances effect on inter-households income
distribution consists in considering these flows as an exogenous source of income that
simply adds to the households’ current income. It consists often in breaking down the Gini
coefficient according to the influence that every source of income has respectively upon this
coefficient (Lerman and Yitzhaki 1985). This methodology allows to estimate the marginal
effect of remittances on the Gini coefficient by considering that all other sources of income
remain constant. By this way, several authors highlight the inequality-decreasing effect
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of remittances on income distribution in recipient countries (Ahlburg, 1991, 1995, 1996 ;
Brown and Connell, 1993). However, according to the first studies on the remittances-
inequality relationship in the Pacific islands, it would seem that these flows have had in
the first time an adverse effect on household income distribution, as much as only the
richest households took part in emigration (Shankman 1976, Connell 1981).
However, as much as emigration often represents very high costs, it is possible to ima-
gine that in some cases, the poorest families cannot afford to defray the cost of emigration
and therefore do not benefit from overseas income transfers. It is in that way that Lipton
(1980), Stahl (1982) and Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) explain why migrants’ remit-
tances can constitute “inequality accelerators” in migrants-source areas. Based on a simi-
lar method of decomposition, some country-case studies confirm empirically this therory
(Leones and Feldman’s, 1998 ; Rivera, 2005 ; Wouterse, 20081).Yang and Martinez (2006),
as for them, found no significant effect of international remittances on income distribution
in Philippines.
By drawing inspiration from the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM), other
economists considered the direct effect of migrants’ remittances, but also the indirect one.
It is possible to imagine that remittances have an effect on households income which receive
them (by a postive way through the relaxation of income constraints2 or by a negative way
through the phenomenon of moral hazard3).
Taylor’s study (1992) on Mexico, is part of the first ones to take into account the indirect
effects of remittances on the distribution of income. By introducing the possible indirect
effects of remittances and long term effects, he finds that the remittances amount in 1982
leads to a decline of the Gini coefficient in 1988 of 0,01 percent. Using the same database,
Taylor and Wyatt (1996) improved this framework by unloosing the constraint according to
which indirect effects are the same for all households. They assume that remittances have
weaker indirect effects on the richest households which do not face liquidity constraints
and which are able to insure themselves against shocks of production without relying on
remittances. They find that when indirect effects are taken into account, the inequality-
decreasing effect of remittances becomes higher given that indirect effect of remittances
on income may be more important for households located in low steps of the income
1Rivera (2005) and Wouterse (2008) confirm however this therory just in the case of international
remittances whereas internal one are found to have an inverse effect (because costs of internal migrations
being less important, the poorest households are more likely to participate to this kind of migration).
2See Stark and Lucas (1985).
3See Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah ( 2005).
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distribution.
Finally, some researchers have examined the distributional effect of migrants’ remit-
tances by using a counterfactual approach. Instead of considering migrants’ remittances
as an exogenous source of income, they look upon them rather as a potential substitute
for domestic earnings. The focus of this approach is on determining whether inequality
level are lower in the current scenario with migration and remittances, than in a scenario
with no-migration. Oberai and Singh (1980) are the first ones who have used this approach
to analyze the impact of remittances on inequality. They show that remittances sent by
migrants living in towns to the rest of their family stayed in the campaign, tend to raise in-
come inequality within the rural region of Punjab in India, whereas by employing a similar
approach, Knowles and Anker (1981) find only a very weak effect of this type of remittances
on the total distribution of income in Kenya. Adams (1991) and Rodriguez (1998) show
that international remittances tend to raise income inequality too, respectively in the case
of Egypt and of the Phillipines. On the contrary, using the same approach, Ratha (2005)
and Lokshin et al. (2007) find an inequality-decreasing effect of remittances.
Furthermore, for a same country, the different approach used seem to lead to contra-
dictory results : when Brown and Jimenez (2007) suppose for example that remitttances
are an exogenous source of income, they find that they lower income inequality in Tonga
and Fiji, whereas they seem to have no significant effect or to raise income inequality when
the authors adopt a counterfactual analysis (the same result is obtained by Barham and
Boucher, 1998). Different results are also obtained for a same country according to the kind
of remittances considered : Adams, Cuecuecha and Page (2008) obtain a different effect of
remittances on poverty and inequality in Ghana (according to they are internal or interna-
tional remittances ; international remittances would be more efficient to lower the poverty
headcount, the poverty depth and the severity of poverty than internal remittances, but
they find that international remittances incrase more income inequality in Ghana than in-
ternal remittances). This finding might be explained by the fact that households receiving
internal remittances and those receiving international remittances are not located in the
same place in the income distribution.
Next to all these country-case studies, we find just few macro-economic studies. We can
cite for example the paper of Acosta et al. (2007) examining the case of 10 countries of Latin
America and Caribbean region. They find that remittances allow to reduce significantly,
albeit slightly, income inequality in the recipient countries4. Using a panel of 64 developing
4They do also in this study a micro-econometric analysis, from which they obtain conflicting results. By
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countries over the period 1988-1998, Chauvet and Mesple-Somps (2006) show that on
average international remittances have a light income equalizing effect at origin.
In sum, empirical findings are not straighforward. They do not allow to know undoub-
tedly whether remittances reduce or increase income inequality within recipient countries.
Results vary with the empirical approach used (remittances considered as exogeneous or
as a substitute for home income), with the type of remittances considered (internal or
international) and with the country examined. Consequently, there has been some efforts
to explain the contradictory findings concerning the impact of migrants’ remittances on
inequality in the recipient countries.
2.2 The remittances-inequality relationship is not monotonic
2.2.1 The role played by the historical background of the recipient countries
Few papers explain conflicting findings concerning the effect of remittances on inequality
by historical specificities of recipient countries, more precisely by their migratory history.
They consider this relationship as a dynamic process. When migration to a new destination
starts taking place, information about the host country and its employment opportunities
are still limited, what leads to high costs of emigrating. Consequently, only well-off house-
holds send some of their members abroad and enjoy remittances, what causes an increase
of inequality within the home country.5. But over time, after the settlement of migrant net-
works in the foreign country, migration costs decline and access to the migration process
become more diffused across sending-area households6 (what is called “network effects”)7.
By making migration affordable for households in the lowest levels of income distribution,
the initially inequality-increasing effect of remittances can be reversed.
By comparing the rural income distribution in two Mexican villages, Stark, Taylor
and Yitzhaki (1988) find for example that in the Mexican village that has recently begun
using a counterfactual methodology, they show that remittances reduce income inequality in Paraguay, in
El Salvador and in Guatemala because in these countries recipient households are predominantly located
in low fringes of the income distribution, whereas in the 6 other sending countries, remittances seem to
increase inequality because it is richest people who benefit from this source of income.
5See Portes and Rumbaut (1990) and Lipton (1980)
6See Massey, Goldring and Durand, 1994
7Jones (1998) distinguishes even a third stage named the later adopter stage corresponding to the time
that the accumulation of migrants’ remittances is so important that new inequalities appear between hou-
seholds with migrants and households without migrants.
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to send migrants abroad, international remittances had an unequalizing effect on income
distribution. On the contrary, remittances from international migrants had an inequality-
decreasing effect on the village that had a long history of participating in migration to the
United States8. By expanding the investigation to a large number of Mexican communities,
McKenzie and Rapoport (2004) find that remittances are all the more equalizing that
communities face high past emigration rates.
Koechlin and Leon (2006) generalize this result by using a cross section of 78 countries
and by introducing in the inequality equation the remittances variable (positive sign) and
its square (negative sign). Their findings provide evidence of the existence of an inverted
U-shaped relationship between international remittances and income inequality
2.2.2 The role played by the socio-economical context of the sending-area
Mc Kenzie and Rapoport (2004) argue that a priori, the effect of remittances on income
inequality cannot be determined because it depends upon the initial distribution level of
income in the recipient countries9.
Gonzales-König and Wodon (2005), as for them, show that the effect of remittances on
the Gini coefficient depends on the average income of the regions of origin. Koechlin and
Leon (2006) add that the development of the financial sector and of the education level of
the population can help home countries to reach the inequality-decreasing section of the
curve faster.
2.2.3 The necessary consideration of whom migrates
In fact, the underlying idea of most of these studies is that the effect of migrants’ remit-
tances on income inequality depends firstly on whom is migrating and remitting, in other
words, on which step of the population they come from. Not having macroeconomic data
on who is migrating, we focus on how remittances impact varies with : the income level at
origin, the costs of migration migrants have to face up and the qualification of the migrants.
8They find similar results in the case of remittances from internal migrants
9 They show that remittances can intensify income inequality if their initial level is high, on the contrary,
remittances can favour income smoothing when the initial inequality level is weaker.
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We argue that the location of migrants in income distribution can mainly be revealed by
the capacities and the incentives individuals have to migrate, that are approximated by
these conditional variables.
3 The theoretical model
Our theoretical model is based on the Gonzalez-König and Wodon’s (2005) one. They
consider a two-period model with a household having two sources of income : the wage
from one of the children and the wage from one adult. They suppose that only the child
can migrate.
The family is considered as a single economic agent. Its utility depends on today’s
consumption, c0, on the present value of parents consumption in period 2, cp, and on cs
which is the consumption of the child who have migrated or not. The family’s utility can
thus be written :
U (cO, cp, cs) = u (c0) + β [V (cp) +W (cs)] (1)
Where β represents the discounting factor and u, V and W are continuously increasing
concave functions.
During the first period, parents work and earn a wage w. If the son works too, he
receives the same wage. If the child migrates, he receives no wage in the first period and
their parents have to pay for migration costs c (c is supposed to be the same for all
households). So total migration cost is composed by the direct migration costs c and by
the income loss w following the departure of the child in the first period. In the second
period, if the child has migrated, he earns a wage wm in the destination region, which is
supposed to be the same for all migrants. Gonzalez-König and Wodon assume also that
the market incompletude induces that households have no access to borrowing for paying
for migration costs in the first period.
To simplify, the price of the current and future consumption is normalized to one. If
the child decides to migrate in the first period, he will remit during the following period
a part α of its wage to the rest of its family (they suppose that remittances are mainly
guided by altruism). But when wm ≤ w , the child cannot migrate and there will be no
remittances.
The constraints of the optimization problem are then :
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c0 = 2w − ζ (w + c)
cp = w + ζ (αwm)
cs = w + ζ ((1− α)wm − w)
With ζ = 1 if the child migrates and 0 otherwise.
Gonzales-König and Wodon write then migration gains for the household as follows :
G (w) = u (w − c)− u (2w) + β [V (w + αwm)− V (w) (2)
+W ((1− α)wm)−W (w)]
The household will participate to migration only when migration gains are positive(G ≥ 0).
u (w − c)−u (2w) is the differential of the household utility in the first period depending
on whether the child migrates or does not. V (wO + αwm) − V (w) represents the gain of
utility following the child migration for those who stay in the region of origin in the second
period and W ((1− α)wm)−W (w) is the migration gain of the child in the second period.
The adaptation of the Gonzales-König and Wodon’s model to our macroe-
conomic approach
The effect of remittances on income inequality depends on whom migrates. So, we aim
at using some variables able to reveal indirectly the location of migrants in the income
distribution, that is to say the socio-economic origin of households for which G (w) ≥ 0.
According to the equation (3) we observe that the participation of households to migration
depends on the level of wage at origin, which represents at the same time the financial ability
and the financial gain of migration (through the differential of wage between countries of
origin and of destination), and on the total migration costs.
Households will take part in migration only if the migration costs they face in the first
period (c+ w), is inferior or equal to the wage gap between the sending country and the
10
destination one, β (wm − w). Nevertheless we can suppose that the very poor households,
for which w is inferior or equal to the cost of emigration (w ≤ c), cannot migrate. As the
same time, if the household is located at the top of the income distribution, its wage is
almost similar to the one in the destination country (w ' wm) and it will not be interessant
to migrate, even if it can defray the migration cost.
However the theoretical model of Gonzalez-König and Wodon does not completely
correspond to the macroeconomic approach we want to have in this study. Their model
focuses on a specific country where income is not equaly distributed among people.
Since we want to adopt a cross-section and macroeconomic appoach, we have to take
into account two main elements which are not considered in the model of Gonzales-König
and Wodon : migration costs varying with countries and the difference in the level of
development of home countries.
– Migration costs and possibility to migrate
In a cross-section study, we have to assume that migration cost householdshave to face up,
differs between countries. To take this difference in costs into account, we use passport cost
in the sending country as well as the distance between the source country and the main
destination of its international migrants. We name ca (cb) the migration costs faced by
people living in a developing country which applicates high (low) costs of passport (with
ca > cb). The implication of variation in migration costs between countries gives some
theoretical predictions which are resumed in Table 1.
[Tab. 1 about here.]
We observe that whatever migration costs may be, the richer households can take part
in the migratory process (cases 3 and 4). Concerning poor households, we can rightfully
imagine that if migration costs are low, they can participate to emigration too. However,
case 1 is ambiguous. We have to consider the level of development of the home country
to know without any doubts, whether they can migrate or not (what we will see later).
Among these four cases, only the one corresponding to the emigration of poor people (case
2) can lead surely to a decreasing of inequality in the home country.
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– Household income and emigration
We argue first that the poorer of a rich country (country 2), will be better-off than the
poorer of a less rich country (country 1). Consequently, it is possible that poor people of
country 2 can defray costs of emigration whereas poor people of country 1 can not.
We name w1 the mean wage of the relatively poor country and w2 the mean wage of
the relatively rich country, with w1 ≤ w2. Poor people of the poorer country earn a wage
w1 and rich people receive a wage w1, with w1 < w1 . Similarly, poor people of the richer
country earn a wage w2 and rich people receive a wage w2, with w2 < w2.
We assume here that the choice of the household to take part in migration depends
only on the financial profits it can gain from it. The implications of these improvements
in our theoretical model are resumed in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
Rich people from the richest countries have no financial incentives to migrate (because
w2 w wm ) and do no migrate. On the contrary, rich people from the poorest countries have
a so bigger financial interest to participate to migration (because w1 < wm) and migrate.
Likewise, whatever is the development level of the sending countries, poor people gain a
financial interest to migrate (w1 < wm et w2 < wm ). But we also have to consider the
financial capacity to migrate if we want to clear up doubts on what happens in case 5. In
this case, poor households can migrate only if migration costs are not too high. However,
we can think that remittances surely reduce income inequality in case 6.
To clear up the ambiguity characterizing cases 1 and 5, it is essential to consider at
once migration costs and level of development.
– Who migrates ?
If we want to know where migrants are located in the income distribution, we have to
combine both conditions necessary to migrate (the financial capacity and the financial
interest). We suppose that people migrate only if their wage at origin is lower than the
average wage (w < wm) and if the wage earned by their family in the country of origin is
high enough to make migration affordable (w > c).
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We suppose that for rich households from relatively richer developing countries, migra-
tion does not represent a significant financial interest, because the gap between the wage
they earn in their home country and the one they can expect after migration, is too weak
to compensate the psychologic costs of migration. So, migration does not constitute an
optimal strategy for this kind of households.
On the contrary, we expect that rich households living in relatively poorer countries are
incited to migrate because on one hand, their income is high enough to pay for migration
costs and because, on the other hand, the wage gap between the two countriesoffers them
a significant expected financial gain (w1 < wm and w1 > c).
Whatever costs of migration may be, poor people from relatively rich developing coun-
tries would take part in migration because the wage gap is sufficiently high to incite them
to migrate, and because even they are issued from the poorer fringes of the population,
given that they live in a relative rich developing country they would be able to defray
migration costs (w2 < wm and w2 > c). In this cases, we can then expect that remittances
have a smoothing effect on inequality in the home country.
Concerning households belonging in low levels of the income distribution in the poorest
countries, even if it would be financially interesting for them to migrate, we assume that
if migration costs are high they can not leave their home country (w1 < wm but w1 < ca).
But if they are living in a closer country (with lower costs of migration), we suppose that
their income, even if it is not very high, allow them to overcome migration costs and to
migrate ( w1 < wm and w1 > cb )10.
By summarizing results in Table 3, we observe that only cases 3’, 5’ and 7’ correspond
to an inequality reduction by remittances. On the contrary, in cases 2’ and 4’ remittances
may increase income inequality within home countries.
[Tab. 3 about here.]
10All these propositions are illustated by the diagramme in the appendix 1
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4 Econometric analysis of the non-monotonic relation bet-
ween remittances and income inequality
4.1 Estimation strategy
In this section we employ quantitative evidence to test the hypotheses formulated be-
fore. We expect that remittances have non-linear effects on income inequality depending
on the location of migrants in the income distribution which can be revealed by the level
of development of recipient countries, migration costs, and by the migrants’ skills.
To provide evidence of our hypotheses, we use successively different interactive terms
(remittances×conditional variable) in our regression analysis. The basic equation is always
completed by introducing a set of control variables which are often used in inequality
equations at the macroeconomic level (Deininger and Squire, 1997 ; Calderon and Chong,
2000, 2006, Koechlin and Leon, 2006 and some others11). Firstly, as did Kuznets (1955),
we control for a possible quadratic relation between the level of economic development
and income inequality. We take also into account the financial development of the home
country, the inflation level, the level of the public consumption, commercial and finan-
cial openess, demographic effects proxied by dependency ratio and finally an institutional
variable represented by the level of democracy.
Our time-series cross-sectional model takes so the following form:
Giniit = α+X′itβ + γZit + δ1wrhit + δ2(wrhit × Zit) + µi + ηit (3)
Where X is the matrix of control variables, Z is the matrix of conditional variables (the
development level, the migration costs and the brain drain level). wrh is the logarithm of
remittances per capita, µi is a country fixed effect and ηit, the error term.
Two coefficients will draw mainly our attention:δ1 and δ2, which give some information
on the marginal impact of remittances on income inequality conditional to some countries
characteristics Z .
11See also Ahluwalia (1976) ; Li, Squire, and Zhou (1998) ; Papanek and Kyn (1986) ; Sudhir and Kanbur
(1993) ; Milanovic (1996) ; and Kuznets (1955).
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– If Z is the level of economic development : δ2 is expected to be significantly nega-
tive, what would confirm the hypothesis according to which remittances reduce more
income inequality in rich countries.
– If Z is migration costs : δ1, measuring the impact of remittances in countries where
migration costs are equal to zero, is expected to have a negative sign, and δ2 would
have to be positive and stastically significant.
– If Z is the level of brain drain : δ2 is expected to be statistically significant and
positive, whereas δ1 , which represents the sensibility of income inequality to migrants’
remittances in countries with a brain drain level equal to zero , would have to be
negative.
4.2 The sample
Our sample varies with regressions from 248 observations (with 52 countries) to 324
observations (80 countries), according to the disponibility of control variables. It contains
only developing countries over 1970-2000.
4.3 The variables
The dependent variable
The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient which measures theintensity of inequa-
lity within countries. Data used are drawn from Branko Milanovic (2005) database. This
database merges three different databases : the one of Deininger and Squire, the one
of the United Nations (WIDER) and the World Income Distribution database (WID).
Thecombination of these three database allow us to have at our disposal of much more ob-
servations12. In order to consider differences concerning the calculation methodology from
one database to another or from one year to another, we introduce in all our estimations
three dummies capturing whether the gini coefficient has been calculated from consump-
tion or income, whether variables used are measured in real or nominal terms and whether
12In fact, it is the combination of two databases, WIDER andWID since the original series in the Deninger
and Squire dataset are incorporated into the UN dataset.
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the basic unit of analysis is the person or the household.
The control variables
The interest variable
Our main interest variable is remittances. Data are drawn from the World Bank data-
base (World Development Indicators). This variable include three categories : “unrequited
transfers” which refer to money sent by migrants to family and friends to the home country,
“migrant transfers” which are equal to the net worth of the migrants (considered here as
individual’s change of residence for at least one year) and finally “compensation of em-
ployees” which represent funds sent back by temporary workers who work abroad for less
than a year. This database provides informations for a lot of countries and over a long
period. We use in our estimation the ratio of remittances receive by the home country on
its total population13.
The conditional variables
The level of development is measured by the logarithm of GDP per capita (World
Development Indicators). Migration costs are measured by the costs to obtain a passeport
in percentage of GDP per capita (McKenzie 2007) and by the distance (in log term) between
a country i and the main destination country j of its international migrants. They are time-
constant variables, thus we cannot introduce these two variables in additive manner in our
econometric models when we already control for country fixed effects.
The importance of the brain drain for each country is defined as the ratio of higly skilled
emigrants who are at least 25 years old to natives (sum of residents or emigrants) having
the same level of skills and the same age14. Data on emigration concern six of the most
destination countries of the OCDE area (Australia, Canada, United-States, Great-Britain,
France and Germany). They are available since 1975 on a five-year interval basis (the World
13Empirical findings obtained by using remittances per capita or the ratio of remittances to GDP are
quite similar. So, we present only results of estimations using remittances per capita.
14To have more details about this database, see "Tendance de long terme des migrations internationales.
Analyse à partir des 6 principaux pays receveurs", by Cécily Defoort.
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Bank 15). Definitions, sources and descriptive statistics of the other control variables are
presented in Table 4.
[Tab. 4 about here.]
4.4 Econometric method
We start our estimates by using ordinary least squares (OLS) with country specific
effects. This methodology controls for heterogeneity between countries and thus for the
structural variables which are stable over time for each country and for others time-constant
variables which have been omitted. But given the potential endogeneity of migrants’ re-
mittances, we then also estimate our models by an instrumental variables strategy (IV).
4.4.1 The endogeneity of migrants’ remittances
Several authors who analyzed the effect of remittances on income inequality raised the
issue of the endogeneity of remittances (Koechlin and Leon, 2006 and Chauvet and Somps,
2008). In the case of remittances, several sources of endogeneity may be highlighted. On
one hand, there may be a measurement error, because remittances statistics at the interna-
tional level do not capture the volume of these flows that passes through informal channels.
On the other hand, there may be an omitted-variable bias as exogenous shocks affecting
developing countries (as price shocks, climatic shocks) which will be both correlated with
the internal distribution of income but also with the volume of remittances. Finally, endo-
geneity may arise because of the existence of a double causality in the relationship between
remittances and income inequality.
Two key features govern the selection of an instrument for remittances: it must be
correlated with remittances, and its effect on the Gini must operate only through its effect
on remittances or through the effect on other variables we already control for.
Lots of instrumental variables for remittances have been proposed, like GDP per capita
or growth rate of host countries for example, but GDP per capita in host countries may be
linked to that of developing countries through the argument of income convergence across
nations. To counter these criticisms, two other variables have then been suggested: the
distance between the country of origin and the main destination of migrants, and a variable
15http ://go.worldbank.org/9PRMDT0N70
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measuring the share of immigrant population in every developing country. Although, these
two variables are correlated with remittances, they suffer from a lack of temporal variability.
Another instrumental variable was also used in the literature: financial costs associated
with remittances. But while interesting, this variable suffers from a lack of availability in
time.
To avoid all these pitfalls, Chami et al (2008) propose a new instrumental variable
capturing general trends in remittances throughout the world: remittances receive by all
recipient countries except the country considered. Admittedly, this instrument does not
eliminate all endogeneity, but it represents a significant improvement over internal, lag-
driven instruments and over previous attempts at obtaining an external instrument. By
excluding the amount of remittances received by the country considered, the variable is
free of a direct causal link with other domestic macroeconomic variables. We calculated
this variable for each country, as the ratio of remittances received by all other countries to
the sum of their population.
In this article, remittances for each countries are instrumented by the value of remit-
tances of the previous period and by the instrument proposed by Chami et al. (2008). We
also use the income gap between the sending country iand the main destination country j.
Data on this variable are taken from Spatafora (2005). Following Milanovic (2005), we also
instrument almost all of our other explanatory variables (trade openness, FDI as a per-
centage of GDP, government consumption as a percentage of GDP) by their lagged value.
Finally, interactives variables were instrumented by the product of excluded instruments
of remittances and each variable Z . We use the estimator derived from the generalized
method of moments (GMM) which is more efficient than the traditional 2SLS method.
Two tests are needed to validate our instrumental variables strategy. First, the Hansen
test of over-identification to assess the validity of our instrumental variables, ie, the lack of
correlation between these variables and the error term of the structural equation. Then,
the strength of selected instruments is apprehended by two statistics: partial-F and Shea’s
R2 derived from the first stage estimations.
We could also use the dynamic panel System-GMMestimator to estimate these models.
How interesting it may be, this strategy would cause us to loose a significant number of
observations in estimates. Consequently we choose not to control for the dynamic properties
of our dependent variable.
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4.5 Estimations results
For each of our theoretical hypotheses, two regressions have been conducted: one by
using the method of ordinary least squares with country fixed effects and the other by
resorting to the generalized method of moments (GMM) again with country fixed effects.
We comment only the results obtained from an IV-GMM approach.
Interesting results have been obtained concerning the coefficients of control variables.
In most cases, the Kuznet’s curve is validated. Trade openness, financial openness (mea-
sured as the ratio of FDI on GDP) and government consumption are factors exacerbating
significantly income inequality in developing countries, while a greater democratization
tends to have an inequality-decreasing effect, what is consistent with our expectations. For
the other control variables, no statistically significant relationship is detected.
4.5.1 Remittances, income level and inequality
The findings appear in Table 5 in Appendix (columns 1 and 2).
[Table 5 about here.]
We find a significant and negative impact of remittances in interaction with the level
of income per capita, but when the variable enters the equation in an additive manner, the
coefficient is positive and significant as we expected. The coefficient of the interaction term
in the regression with instrumentation is higher in absolute value than the one estimated
by ordinary least squares (in the first case the coefficient is -2 whereas in the latter case,
the coefficient is -0.7). The turning point for income per capita beyond which there is an
inequality-decreasing impact of remittances is evaluated at 1763 $USD. Then, we expect
that remittances will reduce significantly income inequality in countries like Botswana or
Tunisia given this model.
So, remittances tend to be favorable to a reduction of income inequality in countries
that have a relatively high level of development. Indeed, as we suggested in our hypotheses,
the poor in these countries can cope with the costs of migration, while the upper classes
have no great interest to migrate. It follows that it is mostly the poor in relatively wealthy
developing countries who migrate and repatriate funds, what is likely to reduce income
inequality in these countries.
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4.5.2 Remittances, brain drain and income inequality
Results are also reported in Table 5 (columns 3 and 4). We crossed the logarithm of
remittances per capita to the rate of initial brain drain of each country (the value of the serie
in 1975). In line with our expectations, the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically
significant and positive, while the coefficient of remittances is negative and corresponds to
the sensitivity of the Gini to remittances in countries with low-skilled migrants. Brain
drain helps to reveal the social origin of migrants of a country: if people who migrate
are highly skilled workers, it is likely that the majority of these individuals belongs to the
wealthier fringes of the population and that remittances will increase income inequality at
home.
The turning point for the level of brain drain below which there is an inequality-
decreasing impact of remittances is evaluated at 27%. Then, we expect that remittances
will reduce significantly income inequality in countries like Mali or Senegal.
4.5.3 Remittances, passport costs and income inequality
The results of both estimates (columns 5 and 6 in Table 5) support our theoretical
hypothesis according to which remittances increase inequality in countries where migration
costs are relatively more important. The Gini sensitivity to remittances is greater (in
absolute value) when we control for the endogeneity of regressors. We also note that the
coefficient of remittances is significantly negative.
The turning point for the level of passport cost in percentage of GDP per capita below
which there is an inequality-decreasing impact of remittances is evaluated at 2,6%. Then,
we expect that remittances will reduce significantly income inequality in countries like
Ghana and Morocco.
4.5.4 Remittances, remoteness and income inequality
When we look at the results of models including the variable distance, we obtains a
significant and non-linear impact of remittances only when we exclude democracy in the
models (columns 7 and 8, Table 5). The fragility of our results may come from our measure
of distance. Indeed, the distance between a country of origin and the main destination
of its international migrants presents the major drawback to be constant over time. This
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reflects the assumption that the main country of destination of migrants for one given
developing country is the same throughout the period. However, the stylized facts highlight
the existence of new migration corridors. Neverthless, our results suggest that remittances
tend to increase income inequality in remote countries because of high transport costs.
4.5.5 Remittances, migration costs and income inequality : The role of income
From an econometric estimation, we try to assess to what extent the effects of migration
costs can be mitigated by the level of income. The following model is constructed:
Giniit = α+X′itβ + δwrhit + γ1Z1it + γ2(Z1it × wrhit) + γ3(Z1it × Z2i) (4)
+γ4(wrhit × Z2i) + γ5(wrhit × Z1it × Z2i) + µi + ηit
where Z1it represents the logarithm of GDP per capita of each country and each year,
while Z2i measures the importance of passport costs in a country16. IV-GMM results are
presented in Table 6.
[Table 6 about here.]
Consistent with our hypothesis, we obtained the result that the level of development
mitigates the impact of migration cost in the sensitivity of income inequality with respect
to remittances. We obtained a significantly negative coefficient of the double product and
migration costs induce a positive impact of remittances on income inequality (the coeffi-
cient of the product of remittances with passport cost is statistically positive and is equal
to 2,77).
16Given the fragility of the results obtained with the variable distance as a proxy of migration cost, we
have prefered the passport costs to measure costs.
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5 The specificity of the Mediterranean Basin
Following our results, we can identify an archetype of a developing country in which
remittances are favorable to the poorest segments of the population. We will now test the
hypothesis that Mediterranean countries fulfill most of these conditions and that remit-
tances reduce income inequality within the population in this region of the world.
To test this hypothesis, we will adopt a three-step approach. As a first step, we calculate,
based on the previous regressions, the sensitivity of remittances in each country of the
Basin and compare on a graph these values to the average of other countries in the rest
of the sample17. In a second step, we rely on statistical tests based on mean differenceon
the conditional variables between mediterranean countries and other developing countries.
We try to answer several questions : (i) Are the mediterranean countries relatively more
developed ? (ii) Are passports costs relatively lower in these countries ? (iii) Are Meditarrean
countries relatively closer to the main locations of their international migrants ? (iv) Is brain
drain relatively lower in this region ? In a third step, we estimate a model explaining income
inequality in which remittances are in interaction with a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the country in question belongs to the Mediterranean Basin and 0 otherwise.
If our hypothesis is validated, then we should obtain a significantly negative coefficient
of the interactive variable, which identifies the differential impact of remittances between
Mediterranean countries and the other developing countries.
5.1 Comparison of the semi-elasticity of income inequality with respect
to remittances
For each country in the Mediterranean Basin, we calculate the derivative of Gini relative
to remittances when the conditional variables Z are valued at their average level in each
country. On the basis of the base econometric model, it refers to :
δGinii
δwrhi
= δˆ1 + δˆ2 × Zi
This value is compared to that taken in the sample of other developing countries that
are not part of the Basin. We calculate a value common to all these countries to facilitate
17To perform this analysis we relied on the results of models estimated with instrumentation.
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the comparison in the chart. This value is given by :
δGini
δwrh
= δˆ1 + δˆ2 × Z
where Z represents the average level of Z in the sample of other developing countries
outside the Mediterranean Basin.
Case 1 : Z = level of development
We construct a scatter plot (Figure 1 in Appendix) in which the x-axis reports the va-
lues of the logarithm of GDP per capita and the y-axis, the derivatives calculated for each
country of the Mediterranean Basin and for all other developing countries outside the Basin.
[Fig. 1 about here.]
For most countries of the Basin, the derivative of Gini with respect to remittances is
negative, in some country like Israel, the impact is greatest in absolute terms. In contrast,
the sensitivity of the Gini with respect to remittances is strictly positive in other developing
countries. These results corroborate our hypothesis that remittances reduce income inequa-
lity in the Mediterranean Basin because this region is relatively richer (more developed),
and because those who are migrating abroad in this region are the poor.
Case 2 : Z = Passport costs
In the x-axis, we have now, the passport costs in percentage of GDP per capita and in
the y-axis the derivatives calculated.
[Fig. 2 about here.]
As before, we observe that the majority of mediterranean countries (except Bosnia,
Turkey and to a lesser extent Lebanon) have a negative sensitivity of income inequality
with respect to remittances (Figure 2 in Appendix). Israel once again appears as the country
where, given the level of passports cost, remittances have a strong negative effect on the
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inequality index. This result confirms our hypothesis that Mediterranean countries are
located in region of the world where remittances can reduce inequality if we take into
account migration costs approximated by the cost of obtaining a passport. Finally, the
sensitivity of the Gini coefficient with respect to remittances in other developing countries
is positive.
Case 3: Z = Importance of brain drain
The last graphical analysis takes into account the intensity of brain drain in the calcu-
lation of the derivative (Figure 3 in Appendix).
[Fig. 3 about here.]
Once again, it appears that most countries of the Mediterranean Basin is located in the
(zone of reference) area where the derivative is negative, while the rest of the developing
countries is located in the region where the derivative is positive. However, we are in the
presence of outliers. They include Israel, Egypt and Lebanon, where the composition of
the workforce abroad is not diverse enough to ensure a negative effect of remittances on
income inequality. The country of the Basin which presents the most significant impact
over the period is Algeria.
It is clear from the above analysis that the Mediterranean region should benefit more
from the positive effects of remittances in reducing inequality. Although we have highlighted
some few outliers, the fact remains that the majority of these countries is generally located
in the area where inequality is reduced through remittances received by households. From
statistical tests based on mean difference between the two sub-samples (the sample of the
mediterranean countries and the sample of other developing countries), we will ensure that
the findings of previous graphical analysis statistically hold.
5.2 Statistical tests based on mean differences between the two sub-
samples
We successively test the null hypothesis that the difference of average values of the
conditional variables Z between the two sub-samples is statistically equal to zero against
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two alternative hypotheses : (i) the difference is significantly positive or (ii) negative. Test
results are presented in Table 7.
[Tab. 7 about here.]
We find that the mediterranean countries compared to other developing countries: (i)
are more developed, (ii) have low migration costs and (iii) export to the developed countries
a more diverse workforce in terms of qualifications. These results are consistent with the
previous graphical analysis. The Mediterranean basin is one of the regions of the developing
world where remittances increase income of the lowest deciles of the income distribution.
It is now necessary to test this intuition with a simple econometric model.
5.3 The specificity of the Mediterranean Basin revealed by an econo-
metric model
To test the hypothesis that remittances significantly reduce income inequality in the
mediterranean basin, we rely on the following specification:
Giniit = α+X′itβ + φ1wrhit + φ2(wrhit ×Medi) + µi + ηit (5)
where X is the matrix of control variables,Meda dummy variable that takes the value 1
if the country belongs to the Mediterranean basin and 0 otherwise. Our hypothesis will be
validated if the coefficient φ2 associated with the remittances variable in interaction with
the dummy Med is significantly negative when the coefficient φ1 is positive. Under this
formulation, the differential impact of migrants’ remittances on income inequality between
the Mediterranean basin and the rest of the developing countries is given by φ2. The im-
pact of remittances on inequality in other developing countries outside the mediterranean
basin is measured by the coefficient φ1. Finally, (φ1 + φ2) identifies the impact of migrants’
remittances on income inequality in the Mediterranean basin. The results of estimations
are presented in Table 8.
[Table 8 about here.]
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In line with our expectations, we find a negative differential impact of migrants’ re-
mittances on income inequality between the mediterranean countries and other developing
countries. This result corroborates our hypothesis that the Meditarrean countries greatly
benefit from remittances for reducing income inequality.
6 Concluding Remarks
This article has examined the relationship between migrants’ remittances and income
inequality in the developing world. We have argued that the ambiguous impact of re-
mittances on income inequality comes from the existence of non-linearities in the level of
development, in the costs of migration and in the skill levels of international migrants.
Indeed, these non-linearities enabled us to reveal the socio-economic status of the migrants
from these countries, the main determinant of the sign of the impact of remittances on
the distribution of income. If it is individuals from the wealthy steps of the population
(often better educated) who migrate the most, then the funds returned by the latter will
maintain the already existing inequalities. Conversely, if the poor are migrating in majority
(perhaps because migration costs are low), then remittances will reduce income inequality
in the origin countries.
Based on a sample of 80 developing countries observed over the period 1970-2000,
our econometric estimates validated all our theoretical assumptions. Remittances usually
reduce inequality in countries: (i) relatively more developed, (ii) where passport costs and
the remoteness are relatively low and (iii), where international migrants are on average
relatively less skilled. Furthermore, the level of income tend to reduce the impact of
migration cost on the sensitivity of income inequality with respect to remittances. These
findings hold even after factoring in endogeneity of remittances.
From these results, we were able to identify three main characteristics of a country in
which remittances reduce income inequality (high average income, low migration cost and
low brain drain). It was found that Mediterranean countries for the most part, have these
criteria. The negative impact of remittances on the Gini of income in this region has been
confirmed empirically.
From the taxonomy constructed in this article, one can logically assumes that with
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regard to regions like sub-Saharan Africa (less developed, high migration costs and char-
acterized by high exodus of skilled labor), remittances could exacerbate income disparities
between segments of the population. Microeconometric studies, however, would be inter-
esting to further explore the relationship between remittances and the income distribution
in developing countries.
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Fig. 1 – Marginal impact of remittances with respect to GDP per capita
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Fig. 2 – Marginal impact of remittances with respect to passport cost
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Fig. 3 – Marginal impact of remittances with respect to brain drain
33
Tab. 1 – Migration costs and financial capacity to migrate
COUNTRY
High costs Low costs
a b
Poor ? (1) Migration (2)
HOUSEHOLD
Rich Migration (3) Migration (4)
Note : Wrintings in italics indicate that in these cases, migration and remittances can lead to a reduction
in income inequality.
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Poor ? (5) Migration (6)
HOUSEHOLD
Rich Migration (7) No migration (8)
Note: A familiy is called “rich” or “poor” according to the relative location it occupies in the distribution of income
at origin. It is not a measure of the absolute poverty but a measure of the relative poverty. Thus, some households
living in richer developing countries are called “poor” even though they may live over the poverty threshold defined
by the World Bank.
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Table 3: Level of development, migration costs and migration
COUNTRY
High migration costs Low migration costs
a b
Poor Rich Poor Rich
1.a 2.a 1.b 2.b
Rich Migration (2’) No migration (6’) Migration (4’) No migration (8’)
HOUSEHOLD
Poor No migration (1’) Migration (5’) Migration (3’) Migration (7’)
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Variables Data Sources Observations Mean Standard dev. Minimum Maximum
Gini Gini all database 576 39.89019 11.48169 17.8 66.25
by Branko Milanovic
Remittances per capita (log) 1930 2.069188 1.977283 -3.755226 6.551673
GDP per capita (log) 3078 6.891317 1.192762 4.532693 9.818113
Government consumption (%GDP) 2992 15.1961 6.80017 0 64.39249
Inflation World Development 2704 58.31789 442.1906 -17.64042 11749.64
FDI %GDP Indicators 2852 2.019289 8.383426 -28.62425 348.1892
M2 %GDP 2895 60.13202 567.7536 .8687639 18798.83
Age dependency ratio 3720 43.62971 5.827445 28.19713 53.7682
Trade openness 3028 67.7908 37.63363 5.314175 280.361
Passport cost %GDP per capita McKenzie (2007) 2697 5.514023 10.31864 0 60.15
Distance (log) Authors 3627 7.619468 .7918658 5.520634 8.9986
brain drain Cécily Defoort 654 36.50693 15.93155 0 81.12417
Med Authors 3937 .1023622 .3031625 0 1
Democracy Polity 2 2511 3.26364 3.868942 0 10
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Table 5: Conditional impact of remittances on income inequality in developing countries, 1970-2000
Dependent variable: Gini OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
GDP per capita (log) 20.45* -3.772 30.04** 28.01** 33.47*** 33.06*** 31.10*** 34.53***
(1.785) (-0.211) (2.112) (2.028) (3.088) (2.811) (2.909) (2.940)
(GDP per capita(log))2 -1.646** 0.121 -2.338** -2.152** -2.485*** -2.426*** -2.340*** -2.652***
(-2.137) (0.0979) (-2.322) (-2.202) (-3.468) (-3.094) (-2.932) (-2.948)
Democracy -0.187 -0.250** -0.177 -0.203 -0.279** -0.253**
(-1.362) (-2.057) (-1.239) (-1.570) (-2.078) (-1.964)
Inflation 0.000443 0.000855 0.000290 0.000271 0.000679 0.000776 0.0000408 0.000332
(0.730) (1.299) (0.399) (0.356) (1.106) (1.394) (0.0526) (0.334)
Financial development (M2%GDP) -0.000396 -0.0196 0.000915 -0.00691 -0.00556 -0.00893 0.00420 -0.0643
(-0.0140) (-0.613) (0.0326) (-0.242) (-0.185) (-0.254) (0.135) (-1.604)
Government consumption %GDP 0.204* 0.333** 0.122 0.106 0.177* 0.213** 0.133 0.128
(1.949) (2.301) (1.035) (0.920) (1.881) (2.305) (1.106) (0.949)
Dependency ratio -0.323 -0.441* -0.246 -0.352 -0.392 -0.594** -0.224 -0.294
(-1.590) (-1.780) (-1.244) (-1.556) (-1.626) (-2.159) (-1.246) (-1.430)
Trade openness 0.0405* 0.0230 0.0465* 0.0376 0.0145 -0.00988 0.0554** 0.0661**
(1.775) (0.829) (1.970) (1.603) (0.687) (-0.412) (2.330) (2.279)
Foreign direct investment %GDP 0.135 0.618* 0.0832 0.0813 0.0965 0.113 0.196** 0.781***
(1.033) (1.775) (0.600) (0.572) (0.687) (0.800) (1.981) (2.677)
Remittances per capita (log) 5.464** 14.95*** -1.057 -2.443* -0.518 -1.454* -2.809 -20.88*
(2.058) (2.725) (-1.130) (-1.667) (-1.157) (-1.832) (-0.717) (-1.714)
(log Remittances per capita)*(log GDP per capita) -0.697* -1.998***
(-1.970) (-2.643)
(log Remittances per capita)*(initial brain drain) 0.0500* 0.0921**
(1.661) (2.026)
(log Remittances per capita)*(Passport cost %) 0.273*** 0.553**
(2.607) (2.551)
(log Remittances per capita)*(log Distance) 0.383 2.610*
(0.762) (1.698)
Constant -13.10 -46.57 -56.03 -57.70
(-0.316) (-0.950) (-1.475) (-1.596)
Observations 310 279 292 266 268 248 341 304
Number of countries 77 61 71 57 60 52 82 65
R2 0.201 0.077 0.189 0.179 0.241 0.201 0.216 0.081
R2-Shea 1 - 0.191 - 0.323 - 0.361 - 0.163
R2-Shea 2 - 0.191 - 0.300 - 0.210 - 0.162
Hansen OID p-value - 0.171 - 0.917 - 0.735 - 0.930
Note :The variables which are suspected of endogeneity are : remittances, remittances*Z, trade openess, foreign direct investment and
government consumption. R 2-Shea (1.2) reflect respectively the R 2 of Shea for the significance of the instruments associated with re-
mittances and remittances*Z. Distance, Brain drain and Passport costs have not been introduced additively in the model because they
are time invariant and we already have controlled for countries fixed-effects. In parentheses we have t statistics corrected for heterosce-
dasticity. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
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Tab. 6 – Remittances, migration cost, income and inequality
Dependent variable: Gini IV
GDP per capita (log) 7.500
(0.315)
(log GDP per capita)2 -0.805
(-0.537)








Government consumption (%GDP) 0.236*
(1.888)




(Passport cost)*(log GDP per capita) 1.001
(0.561)
Remittances per capita (log) 4.642
(0.607)
(log Remittances per capita)*(log GDP per capita) -0.749
(-0.750)
(log Remittances per capita)*(Passport cost) 2.770*
(1.888)
(log Remittances per capita)*(Passport cost)*(log GDP per capita) -0.389*
(-1.667)
Observations 261






Hansen OID p-value 0.247
Note: In parentheses we have t statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity. * significant at 10%, ** significant at
5% and *** significant at 1%. All interactive variables including remittances are instrumented by the product of
remittances instruments and conditional variables Z . The indices 1 to 4 after the R 2-Shea refer respectively to the
significance of the instruments associated with remittances and all other interactive variables including remittances
in order of appearance in the table above.
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Tab. 7 – Statistical tests based on mean differences on the conditional variables
Conditional variables (Z)
GDP per capita Passport cost Brain drain
Z0=1850 Z1=3007 Z0=5,77 Z1=3,28 Z0=37 Z1=29
Z0-Z1<0 0 0,99 1
Z0-Z1=0 0 0 0
Z0-Z1>0 1 0 0
Note: Index 1 refers to the sample of countries of the mediterranean basin and 0, to that of other developing
countries. Values in the table represent the p-values associated with the hypotheses.
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Table 8: Impact of migrants’ remittances on income inequality in the Mediterranean basin
Dependent variable: GINI: OLS with countries fixed effects
GDP per capita (log) 32.460***
(3.06)




Age dependency ratio -0.258
(1.29)




Government consumption (%GDP) 0.158
(1.38)




Remittances per capita (log) 0.501
(1.27)




Number of observations 310
Number of countries 77
R2 0.19
Note: In parentheses, we have t statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity. *significant at 10%, ** significant
at 5% et *** significant at 1%.
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